Amazon Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Garry#MarescaOut (@AloneWithTism) reported 4 minutes ago

  @idonotexistelol I can't buy physical anymore. GameStop has shut down in Ireland since COVID. My nearest Smyth's is 30 mins away Amazon dont do quick deliveries to me even with prime. I got locked out of physical gaming a long time ago. It doesn't mean I don't want it to continue.

• 
  ryan mccarthy (@ClassicMoviesR) reported 5 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp is this common problem? Missing claim code numbers?

• 
  TheValueist (@TheValueist) reported 6 minutes ago

  RPO IS NOT A LOAN BOOK The source’s most consequential analytical error is the treatment of RPO as a loan or lease receivable. Under ASC 606, RPO represents transaction price allocated to performance obligations that remain unsatisfied or partially unsatisfied. Revenue is recognized when the provider satisfies the performance obligation by transferring the promised good or service. An unconditional right to consideration is presented separately as a receivable. RPO itself is a disclosure, not a balance-sheet financial asset. (FASB) This distinction changes loss measurement. A $100 billion reduction in future RPO does not generally create a $100 billion cash loss or impairment. The provider may avoid future electricity, labor, maintenance, chip purchases, construction, and other variable or cancellable costs. The provider may retain prepayments or termination payments. Capacity may be redeployed. Only capital already spent, unavoidable future obligations, receivables, contract assets, lease commitments, and unrecoverable dedicated assets constitute exposure at default. The correct credit formulation is closer to: Expected loss = probability of default x exposure at default x loss severity. Exposure at default should include unpaid unconditional receivables, unamortized dedicated capital expenditure, non-cancellable supplier commitments, lease obligations, guarantees, and restructuring costs, less prepayments, collateral, recoverable hardware value, avoidable operating costs, termination rights, and redeployment value. The source instead frequently applies gross RPO as though it were funded principal. This can overstate risk by an order of magnitude when a large portion of the commitment represents services and costs that have not yet been delivered or incurred. It can also understate risk when material infrastructure commitments sit outside RPO, including uncommenced leases, power take-or-pay agreements, construction obligations, guarantees, and supplier purchase commitments. The broad $2.1 trillion aggregate is arithmetically plausible. Microsoft reported approximately $625 billion of commercial RPO, Oracle reported $638 billion, Alphabet reported $467.6 billion, and Amazon disclosed approximately $364 billion of long-term customer commitments, producing an aggregate of approximately $2.095 trillion. The aggregation is not fully comparable because company definitions, inclusion thresholds, reporting periods, contract durations, reserves, and cancellation provisions differ. (Microsoft) Duration is materially different across the companies. Microsoft disclosed a weighted-average commercial RPO duration of approximately 2.5 years and expected approximately 25 percent to convert to revenue within 12 months. Amazon disclosed a weighted-average remaining contract life of approximately 5.5 years. Alphabet expected just over 50 percent of backlog to be recognized within 24 months. These differences alter duration risk, price risk, customer credit exposure, and the amount of capital required before revenue conversion. (Microsoft) The customer concentration evidence is also uneven. Microsoft publicly disclosed that approximately 45 percent of commercial RPO was attributable to OpenAI. This confirms a very large and economically relevant concentration. Comparable public disclosures supporting the source’s exact concentration estimates for Oracle, Alphabet, and Amazon were not identified in the reviewed filings. The source’s claimed 54 percent Oracle, 43 percent Alphabet, and 51 percent Amazon exposure to OpenAI and Anthropic may reflect private estimates or look-through assumptions, but those estimates should not be treated as audited disclosure. (Microsoft) Oracle provides the clearest rebuttal to the blanket loan-book framing. Oracle reported that most of its recent RPO increase came from large AI contracts in which the customer either prepaid Oracle for GPU purchases or purchased and supplied the GPUs directly. Oracle stated that prepaid and customer-supplied hardware associated with large AI contracts totaled approximately $75 billion. This shifts a significant portion of initial hardware funding and residual-value risk away from Oracle, although Oracle still retains construction, operating, financing, execution, and customer-concentration risk. (Oracle Investor Relations) RPO should therefore be decomposed rather than capitalized as a homogeneous asset. The relevant dimensions are customer identity, legal obligor, guarantor, prepayment, cancellation rights, minimum usage, price indexation, delivery milestones, contract duration, hardware ownership, residual-value support, jurisdiction, termination damages, reserves, and percentage of required capital already committed. Gross RPO without these attributes is not a sufficient credit metric. OPENAI AS THE CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY The source is directionally correct that OpenAI has become a major common factor across the AI infrastructure ecosystem. OpenAI has relationships spanning Microsoft, Oracle, AWS, CoreWeave, Google Cloud, Nvidia, AMD, Broadcom, data-center developers, and strategic investors. Microsoft alone disclosed that approximately 45 percent of its commercial RPO was attributable to OpenAI. Amazon disclosed an expanded OpenAI cloud commitment that added approximately $100 billion over 8 years to an existing $38 billion arrangement. OpenAI therefore represents a significant concentration node rather than merely another software customer. (Microsoft) The description of OpenAI as a borrower “with no income” is materially inaccurate. OpenAI disclosed approximately $2 billion of monthly revenue as of March 2026, implying approximately $24 billion of annualized revenue before seasonality or further growth. It reported more than 900 million weekly active users, more than 50 million subscribers, enterprise revenue exceeding 40 percent of total revenue, and API throughput above 15 billion tokens per minute. These figures do not establish profitability or adequate coverage of future compute commitments, but they demonstrate substantial operating income-generation capacity in the commercial sense. (OpenAI) The distinction between revenue and free cash flow remains critical. OpenAI can possess meaningful revenue and still be a weak credit if gross margins, research spending, inference costs, training expenditure, infrastructure commitments, and working-capital needs generate persistent cash burn. Publicly available information does not provide audited consolidated financial statements sufficient to verify the source’s estimated 57 percent burn-to-revenue ratio, cumulative $115 billion cash destruction through 2029, or more than $600 billion of future take-or-pay obligations. These estimates should be treated as scenario assumptions rather than established facts. The March 2026 financing materially weakens the source’s claim that OpenAI’s refinancing mechanism is already failing. OpenAI closed $122 billion of committed capital at an $852 billion post-money valuation. It also expanded an undrawn revolving credit facility to approximately $4.7 billion. A subsequent $520 million Bank of America credit line further broadened its lender base. These transactions do not eliminate long-term funding risk, but they demonstrate that primary capital and bank credit remained available after the alleged deceleration in valuation step-ups. (OpenAI) The source’s statement that “the markup is the cash flow” conflates price with proceeds. A valuation increase does not produce cash unless accompanied by a primary issuance. A flat or down round can provide substantial liquidity. A high valuation step-up can provide little liquidity if most of the transaction is secondary. The relevant variables are primary capital raised, financing conditions, tranching, milestones, liquidation preference, dilution, cash burn, and contractual commitments, not merely the ratio between successive headline valuations. The $122 billion financing illustrates the problem. At an $852 billion post-money valuation, the new committed capital represents approximately 14.3 percent of post-money value before adjusting for transaction structure, staged funding, and secondary components. The implied pre-money valuation is approximately $730 billion. A 1.23x future valuation step-up could still fund a very large primary offering. The source’s assertion that a 1.23x valuation step-up cannot fund an estimated $115 billion cumulative burn is not mathematically established. Funding capacity depends on the size of the issuance and acceptable dilution, not on the step-up ratio alone. The source’s IPO argument is similarly too deterministic. OpenAI confidentially filed for a US initial public offering in June 2026 and reportedly targeted a valuation of up to $1 trillion. Subsequent reporting indicated that management was considering a 2027 listing rather than accepting a lower near-term valuation. A delay may indicate valuation resistance, disclosure sensitivity, operational preparation, strategic flexibility, market timing, or a desire to remain private while executing partnerships. It is a warning signal, but it is not equivalent to a failed refinancing. (Reuters) The IPO remains relevant because public-market scrutiny would require materially more disclosure of losses, customer economics, contractual obligations, related-party arrangements, risk concentration, and capital requirements. The source correctly identifies this transparency threshold as a potential catalyst. The stronger claim that public markets are the unavoidable final refinancing pool is less secure after a $122 billion private round involving strategic investors, asset managers, sovereign-linked capital, hedge funds, mutual fund complexes, and bank-distributed individual capital. OpenAI’s revenue mix also appears to be improving relative to the source’s description of approximately 60 percent consumer exposure. Enterprise revenue exceeded 40 percent as of March 2026 and was expected by OpenAI to reach parity with consumer revenue by the end of 2026. Consumer exposure still produces higher churn and potentially greater discretionary sensitivity than deeply embedded enterprise workloads, but the direction of mix reduces rather than increases concentration in subscription consumers. (OpenAI) Token efficiency and open-weight competition are legitimate risks, but their economic effect is ambiguous. Lower tokens per task and lower inference prices reduce revenue per unit of raw compute if demand is inelastic. They can also increase use cases, user engagement, agentic workflow length, and total inference volume if demand elasticity exceeds the price decline. The relevant variable is gross profit per installed compute unit over the full utilization curve, not tokens per task or token price in isolation. OpenAI explicitly argues that lower delivery costs and improved capabilities increase usage and revenue per unit of compute. That argument remains unproven at mature scale but cannot be dismissed mechanically. (OpenAI) OpenAI should therefore be treated as a high-growth, high-burn, strategically important, externally financed counterparty with substantial revenue and unusually broad access to capital. “Subprime” captures dependence on refinancing and potentially weak current coverage. It obscures the company’s scale, revenue growth, strategic sponsorship, financing access, and option value. A more precise description is a non-investment-grade growth counterparty whose credit quality is dominated by future gross margins, primary capital access, contractual flexibility, and enterprise monetization. MICROSOFT’S ACTUAL EXPOSURE The source interprets Microsoft’s April 2026 partnership restructuring as evidence that the best-informed counterparty abandoned OpenAI’s liabilities while retaining equity upside. The observable facts support risk reduction but not abandonment. Microsoft remains OpenAI’s primary cloud partner. OpenAI products are expected to launch first on Azure unless Microsoft cannot or elects not to provide the required capabilities. Microsoft retains a non-exclusive license to OpenAI intellectual property through 2032. OpenAI continues revenue-share payments to Microsoft through 2030. Microsoft remains a major shareholder. (The Official Microsoft Blog) Reuters reported that Microsoft’s revenue share remains 20 percent through 2030, subject to an undisclosed cap, and that OpenAI’s commitment to purchase at least $250 billion of Azure services by 2032 remained in place. These are not the economics of a counterparty that has exited exposure. They are the economics of a counterparty that has reduced exclusivity, diversified strategic dependence, capped certain economics, and preserved a large contractual and equity relationship. (Reuters) Microsoft’s actions can still be interpreted as duration and concentration management. Ending exclusivity allows OpenAI to obtain capacity from competitors and reduces Microsoft’s obligation to fund the full infrastructure requirement. Microsoft has expanded internal model development and third-party model availability, reducing dependence on a single laboratory. The resulting structure transfers part of OpenAI’s infrastructure financing requirement to Amazon, Oracle, Google, CoreWeave, and other providers. This is evidence of prudent risk distribution, not definitive evidence that Microsoft expects OpenAI to default. Microsoft’s own reported numbers indicate both risk and resilience. Approximately 45 percent of commercial RPO was attributable to OpenAI, creating exceptional customer concentration. At the same time, the remaining RPO grew approximately 28 percent and reflected broader portfolio demand. Microsoft reported that approximately 2 thirds of quarterly capital expenditure was directed toward shorter-lived assets, primarily GPUs and CPUs, while the remaining spending supported assets expected to monetize for at least 15 years. Customer demand continued to exceed supply. (Microsoft) The appropriate conclusion is that Microsoft is highly exposed to OpenAI’s performance but retains multiple offsets: revenue share, equity ownership, intellectual-property rights, internal AI demand, Azure’s broader customer base, fungible infrastructure, and substantial operating cash flow. An OpenAI restructuring would damage bookings, utilization, cloud growth, margins, and the value of Microsoft’s investment. It would not automatically create a corporate solvency event. ANTHROPIC AS A COMPARATIVE CREDIT The source’s distinction between OpenAI and Anthropic is directionally useful. Anthropic has a more enterprise-oriented commercial position, significant strategic support from Amazon and Google, and access to multiple cloud platforms. Anthropic raised $65 billion in May 2026 at a $965 billion post-money valuation and reported run-rate revenue above $47 billion. It also disclosed substantial new capacity commitments across AWS, Google and Broadcom TPUs, Microsoft Azure availability, and other infrastructure providers. (Anthropic) The $35 billion Broadcom AI infrastructure financing led by Apollo and supported by Blackstone and global banks demonstrates the institutionalization of AI project finance. The platform was designed to provide more than 20GW of capacity through 2028, with the initial transaction supporting more than 1GW for Anthropic. This validates the source’s broader claim that AI infrastructure is becoming a financed asset class supported by contracted cash flows. (Apollo Global Management, Inc.) The exact protection described by the source requires caution. Public announcements confirm the size, purpose, counterparties, and infrastructure platform. They do not fully disclose the source’s claimed Google lease-shortfall guarantee, Broadcom residual-value guarantee across the stated senior tranche, Anthropic’s alleged $1.70 of revenue per $1 of compute, approximately 80 percent enterprise mix, or 9 percent burn-to-revenue ratio in 2027. Some of these figures may derive from private diligence or financing documents, but they are not established by the reviewed public disclosure. Anthropic appears better insulated, but the same refinancing issue remains. A $965 billion valuation against $47 billion of run-rate revenue implies an exceptionally high valuation multiple before considering gross margin, stock compensation, cash burn, infrastructure commitments, and concentration. Large strategic investments from infrastructure counterparties can also create circularity similar to the source’s critique of OpenAI. Anthropic should therefore be considered a stronger speculative credit than OpenAI only on a relative basis, not an investment-grade operating borrower. HYPERSCALER CAPITAL EXPENDITURE The scale of the capital cycle is indisputably large. Reuters reported approximately $800 billion of expected AI-related capital expenditure in 2026 and a Morgan Stanley estimate of approximately $1.12 trillion for 2027. The source’s $1.1 trillion figure is therefore within current high-end forecasts. It should not be treated as a settled consensus because forecast definitions vary across data centers, chips, power, software, enterprise equipment, hyperscalers, laboratories, and infrastructure developers. (Reuters) The source’s aggregate capital expenditure-to-operating-cash-flow ratio is directionally useful but analytically incomplete. Operating cash flow includes working-capital effects, customer prepayments, stock-based compensation, tax timing, and changes in vendor terms. Capital expenditure can be funded through cash purchases, finance leases, operating leases, customer-supplied equipment, supplier financing, project debt, special-purpose vehicles, and prepayments. Aggregating capital expenditure across firms and dividing by operating cash flow can identify rising external funding dependence, but it does not measure solvency or economic return. Microsoft expected approximately $190 billion of calendar 2026 capital expenditure, including approximately $25 billion attributable to higher component pricing. Management continued to expect capacity constraints through 2026 and modest Azure growth acceleration during the 2nd half. This does not indicate an observed capex retrenchment. It indicates continued spending despite falling near-term free cash flow because management believes demand remains supply constrained. (Microsoft) Alphabet generated $45.8 billion of operating cash flow and spent $35.7 billion of capital expenditure in Q1 2026, leaving $10.1 billion of free cash flow. It retained $126.8 billion of cash and marketable securities and $77.5 billion of long-term debt. Google Cloud revenue grew 63 percent to $20 billion, while Google Services generated a 45.3 percent operating margin. This profile contains substantial capital intensity but does not resemble a refinance-dependent project borrower. (Alphabet Investor Relations) Alphabet nevertheless has significant off-balance-sheet and forward obligations. It disclosed $75.6 billion of data-center leases that had not commenced, $332.4 billion of purchase commitments and other contractual obligations, existing financial guarantees and credit derivatives with maximum potential payments of $9 billion and $28.4 billion, and additional potential infrastructure backstops. These commitments support the source’s broader warning that reported debt understates total infrastructure exposure. They also demonstrate why gross capital expenditure and debt figures alone are insufficient. (SEC) Meta increased 2026 capital expenditure guidance to $125 billion-$145 billion from $115 billion-$135 billion while continuing to expect operating income above 2025. The source identifies Meta as the likely 1st hyperscaler to reduce spending because it lacks an external public-cloud business. This overlooks the direct monetization of AI through recommendation quality, advertising conversion, engagement, content creation, messaging, and internal productivity. Meta’s AI returns are less visible as cloud revenue but can still be economically substantial. (AtMeta) Meta may nevertheless possess greater flexibility to cut because a larger portion of its spending supports internal workloads rather than externally contracted cloud capacity. Dual-class control can also permit management to change spending without immediate governance pressure. These factors make Meta a plausible marginal adjuster, but the prediction that Meta will necessarily blink 1st is not supported by current guidance or disclosed operating trends. Amazon exhibits greater external financing pressure. Trailing-12-month operating cash flow reached approximately $148.5 billion, while cash capital expenditure reached approximately $147.3 billion, leaving approximately $1.2 billion of reported free cash flow. Q1 2026 cash capital expenditure was approximately $43.2 billion. Amazon also invested $15 billion in OpenAI, committed to an additional $35 billion subject to conditions, and stated that additional financing activity was expected. (SEC) Amazon’s long-term debt face value increased from approximately $68.8 billion at year-end 2025 to approximately $122.6 billion at March 2026, including large US-dollar and euro-denominated note offerings. The combined weighted-average remaining life of the notes was approximately 14.2 years. This is a substantial increase in leverage, but the long maturity profile reduces near-term refinancing risk relative to a short-duration project vehicle. (SEC) Oracle is the clearest public-market example of the source’s credit concerns. Fiscal 2026 operating cash flow was approximately $32 billion, while free cash flow was negative $23.7 billion. Oracle raised approximately $43 billion of debt and $5 billion of equity during fiscal 2026 and expected approximately $40 billion of additional debt and equity financing in fiscal 2027. RPO reached approximately $638 billion. Oracle’s smaller legacy cash-flow base, rapidly rising infrastructure commitment, and concentrated AI backlog make its equity and credit substantially more sensitive to execution and customer quality than Microsoft or Alphabet. (Oracle Investor Relations) Oracle’s risk is mitigated by approximately $75 billion of prepaid or customer-supplied hardware in large AI contracts. That structure reduces funded exposure and directly contradicts the assumption that Oracle necessarily advances the entire GPU principal. Oracle remains exposed to data-center construction, power, financing, operating costs, contract performance, residual assets, and customer concentration. The correct conclusion is high but structured exposure, not an uncollateralized gross loan equal to RPO. The cross-company evidence demonstrates extreme heterogeneity. Microsoft and Alphabet retain broad profitable cloud and software franchises, large internal workloads, and substantial liquidity. Meta retains a highly profitable advertising engine and flexible internal use. Amazon has meaningful AWS profitability but near-zero consolidated free cash flow after the current capital cycle and sharply higher debt. Oracle has the highest visible financing dependence. Aggregate ratios obscure these differences and can produce misleading portfolio conclusions.

• 
  Bolta (@BRBarwal) reported 7 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Order ID: 402-8345769-2370744 ​Product: Sleepyhead Flip Designed by Duroflex Mattress ​Order Date: 4 July 2026 ​Grand Total Paid: ₹3,247.03 (After applying special bank/EMI discounts) ​The Issue:

• 
  Matthew House (@Pack_Rat_EWaste) reported 9 minutes ago

  @carryingmarine @amazon there are two problems here. First, insufficient packaging. Seriously, a non padded envelope for ram?(I read the thread before posting, because I'm not an idiot.) The second problem is employee quality. Amazon can fix the first problem, probably.

• 
  ryan mccarthy (@ClassicMoviesR) reported 9 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp I have to say this day has been an absolute let down. I was looking forward to ordering some comic books on Amazon. Never in a million years did i think this would happen to me.

• 
  Bort M (@bort17) reported 13 minutes ago

  @stepfanie Amazon conditions customers to be lousy on purpose as a business strategy to choke out small merchants who can't afford "hassle-free" returns and fraud. Typical monopoly behavior that a civilized society would shut down.

• 
  sheron paul (@sheronpaul6) reported 14 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp @AmazonHelp Yesterday I was told the issue was escalated. Today, nothing has changed. If escalation doesn’t lead to action, what’s the point? Three consecutive days of failed deliveries. As an Amazon Prime customer, I expect a solution, not repeated promises.

• 
  Emilio (@JorgeEmilioMel1) reported 15 minutes ago

  @TFHypeGuy @Vi_DoeEnjoyer Yeah, true, but seeing as Hasbro doesn't care about non US markets for the most part, sometimes resellers on Amazon or AliExpress are genuinely the best options for people in my country. I fear that in "fixing" the reseller problem in the US, they are just ******* us over more

• 
  TXGirl (@WendyDFW78) reported 16 minutes ago

  @KellyClinger I had my issues with cable, but I miss it. We’re gonna cancel all of our apps and just keep Disney+ and YouTube TV. We only keep prime because it’s yearly and we order from Amazon occasionally. But that’s it. Most of the movies and shows that come out today are crap anyway. I’ve been watching a lot of the older movies lately. I’m even making a list of the movies to rewatch.🤪

• 
  Christopher Fleming (@IAO_AntiChrist) reported 18 minutes ago

  @TruthSeek01011 @grok 93, hail antichrist! She is a black hat magician? Left hand pather huh? Or am I missing anything, she’s deliberately manipulating mentally ill people. For her own gain. Concur? 😡 1/ Influencer opens vid seriously: “2 types of parasite cleanses—trendy herbal vs med-prescribed. Not all equal.” Pushes Wellness Co cleanse for lighter body & more energy. Use TRUTHSEEKER for $60 off. 2/ Trans: Watched vids, joined affiliate, now needs u to spend $540 for her cut. Actual price: $540-600. 3/ Same ingredients (IVM + mebendazole) in horse paste for $15 on Amazon. Same mol, diff price, better mktg. 4/ Claims “2 degrees.” Which? Where? Still waiting while she hawks $540 rebranded dewormer. 5/ Last mo: alien Reptilians brainwashing, stealing kids, drinking blood. This mo: intestinal parasites w/ $540 sponsor fix. Olympic pivot. 6/ “Researched heavily” ignores $15 Tractor Supply/Amazon option—she earns more if u miss it. 7/ Real cleanse: ur wallet lighter, she gets comm. Skip influencer w/ consp calendar & aff biz plan. Get better med advice sources. Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law. Love is the law. Love under Will. 666 -AntiChrist / Abaddon

• 
  Yesha Brahmbhatt (@Yesha_B) reported 20 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp I replied as there is surely some technical error. 8 of the different items says there is some problem with your order. Whereas it was delivering to my address before.

• 
  Puneet arora (@Puneetaror31160) reported 21 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Order #: 407-9589467-2256331 Why this order is canceled could you tell me my address in app is right but I got message that order is cancelled due to address issue this is amazon fresh order

• 
  Superman (@Superman18d) reported 23 minutes ago

  @smcoltd0089 @X I think this is manufacturing issue you should contact to the amazon care and service centre

• 
  Made2Mav🫧 (@mavmade2) reported 24 minutes ago

  @EricGymFan @RSG33_ @baileylikemovie i think rotten tomatoes is better for casual movie watchers (99% of the world) and letterboxd is better for people who are into more artsy and oscar type movies. also amazon didnt even change the imdb layout at all, ur issue with the site has nothing to do with who owns it