Amazon Outage Map

Community Discussion

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Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Amazon Help (@AmazonHelp) reported 7 minutes ago

  Hey there! Thanks for reaching out to us and sharing your feedback. While Alexa for Shopping cannot be removed entirely, the chat window can be dismissed or closed. If you're on the chat window in the Amazon Shopping app, you can dismiss the Alexa for shopping screen either by swiping down the chat window, by clicking on the Alexa icon in the bottom of your app, or clicking on the cross (x) in the top of the chat window. Hope this helps. -Tasha

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  Kolluru Akhil Teja (@akhilteja099) reported 7 minutes ago

  @ZeptoNow Placed order OIJJRHNRL21779 purchased 3 rakhi special amazon GC issued by pine labs and when we are trying to add it in amazon it is throwing validation error.Please help.Reference Id 6014854979439364,6014854979329348,6014854979407104 @AmazonHelp @PineLabs

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  Shuaib Dehqani (@shuaibdehqani) reported 9 minutes ago

  @amazon @amazonIN why is it taking a complete lifetime to issue a refund?

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  Matt Pauley 🎙️ (@MattPauleyOnAir) reported 9 minutes ago

  Perhaps I’m not being fair and Amazon just picked up the Victory + deals in Dallas and Anaheim and eventually they will also start charging like the other Prime teams. But the optics are still terrible. #stlblues

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  pmanik (@pmanik94) reported 11 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp I did not any resolution from you guys in this chat. I am not sure why customer will face problem if there is system glitch from amazon @amazonIN @PMOIndia

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  GeoFinance 💰🐵 (@SillyWorkMedia) reported 11 minutes ago

  What's wrong with Canadians about having data centres built within our city? If that's the case, do you enjoy one-day Amazon deliveries, fresh groceries, and instant electricity? This is the advantage of having logistics warehouses and electricity substations within our city. This is why cities have zoning. We have so much space far out in the city (look at both sides of Hwy 99). Do you see Amazon warehouses in the city cores? No, they are way out there from residential land. If the data centre is behind your backyard, this is the city's zoning issue, not the data centre issue. You do know Canada has one of the strictest environmental bylaws in the world. I doubt our environmentalists will allow any polluted water to flow out of those data centres. Sure, Canada can have ZERO data centres. China and India will happily build them and shut us down at any moment. Think about it, Canadians.

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  Atul srivastava (@atul370) reported 21 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Poor pathetic service by @amazonIN @AmazonHelp no one contacted me nor no one bothered for customer issues.

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  Captain Coordination (@KleptoBek) reported 23 minutes ago

  @akafaceUS A lot of malls died long before Amazon became a thing, due to security challenges & ridiculously high overhead costs, among other problems.

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  Raye (@rayemarkets) reported 24 minutes ago

  Every time Damodaran uploads a video, I always watch it because he usually takes a concept that sounds simple on the surface and then breaks down the incentives and economics underneath it, and this discussion on scaling versus profitability is a good example. The common startup narrative is that companies should grow as quickly as possible, capture market share, and worry about profits later, but Damodaran's argument is that this approach only works when the structure of the business actually supports it. A large addressable market and fast revenue growth can tell us how big a company might become, but they tell us very little about how valuable that company will eventually be unless growth can translate into better unit economics, operating leverage, pricing power, and returns on invested capital. A company can therefore become much larger without becoming economically stronger, and in some cases scaling simply multiplies the weaknesses that were already embedded in the original business model. This is why the distinction between scalability and business quality is so important. Software businesses can often add customers at very low marginal cost, meaning revenue can grow much faster than the underlying cost base, while businesses involving manufacturing, logistics, physical infrastructure, or expensive customer acquisition may require significant incremental spending for every additional dollar of revenue. Even within technology, being asset-light does not automatically solve the problem because customer acquisition costs, incentives, cloud infrastructure, research spending, and competition can effectively become variable costs that rise alongside growth. Scale only creates meaningful operating leverage when the incremental economics improve as the company gets larger, and if costs continue rising roughly in line with revenue, the company may eventually discover that what looked like a temporary profitability problem was actually structural. Amazon is therefore an important example, but also a dangerous template for other startups to copy. Amazon could tolerate years of weak accounting profitability because its scale was gradually building infrastructure, distribution density, customer relationships, marketplace liquidity, and purchasing power that improved the economics of the business over time, so the losses were connected to assets and competitive advantages that eventually supported much greater profitability. The mistake is assuming that every company reporting losses while growing quickly is following the same path, because some businesses are simply using investor capital to subsidize prices, acquire customers, or enter markets without creating corresponding economic advantages. Both companies can initially show the same headline numbers of rapid revenue growth and negative earnings, but one may be accumulating future operating leverage while the other is accumulating obligations that require continuous external capital. Damodaran's "Field of Dreams" can become a "Field of Nightmares" precisely when investors assume profitability will automatically appear once sufficient scale has been reached. The venture capital structure makes this problem more interesting because the incentives of the investor and the economics of the underlying company are not necessarily aligned. Venture portfolios depend heavily on a relatively small number of very large winners, which means a venture capitalist may rationally prefer a founder to pursue a much larger and riskier outcome rather than build a smaller company producing steady profits. A company that could become a profitable business worth a few hundred million dollars may be economically attractive to its founder, employees, and customers, but it might barely move the returns of a multibillion-dollar venture fund, while turning that same company into a speculative attempt at a ten-billion-dollar outcome provides much more upside to the fund. Scaling therefore becomes partly a consequence of portfolio mathematics rather than purely a consequence of what is optimal for the company itself, which helps explain why startups are frequently encouraged to expand geographically, add products, increase hiring, and raise increasingly large funding rounds even before the economics of the original business have been fully proven. Damodaran's point about pricing versus valuation extends this incentive further. Private markets frequently anchor financing rounds around comparable transactions, revenue multiples, user growth, subscribers, or projected future revenue rather than the present value of sustainable future cash flows, so scale itself becomes an input into the next financing round. Once that happens, raising capital can create a self-reinforcing cycle where capital funds growth, growth supports a higher private-market price, the higher price enables another larger funding round, and that new capital funds even more growth. During favorable capital-market conditions this cycle can continue for years, making it difficult to distinguish between a genuinely improving business and a company whose growth is partly being manufactured by increasingly abundant financing. The real test only arrives when the marginal investor becomes less willing to finance losses and the company has to demonstrate that customers, margins, and cash generation can support the business without constant capital injections. The expansion of private capital has allowed this process to continue much further than it could several decades ago. Companies historically reached public markets relatively early because public equity was one of the few ways to obtain the capital required for large-scale expansion, whereas mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity firms, crossover investors, and very large venture funds can now provide billions of dollars while companies remain private. Damodaran describes this as the creation of a gray market between traditional venture capital and public equity, and one consequence is that startups can reach enormous revenue bases and valuations before facing the level of disclosure, governance scrutiny, and profitability expectations traditionally associated with public companies. His data also show how much this has changed the profile of companies reaching the public market, with companies generally arriving larger in revenue terms but substantially less likely to be profitable than companies going public several decades ago. There is also a governance dimension that becomes increasingly important as companies scale privately. A founder managing a small startup and a founder controlling an organization worth tens or hundreds of billions of dollars are effectively running very different institutions, yet rapid private-market scaling can allow the governance structure of the first company to survive into the second. Founder control, dual-class shares, fragmented investor bases, and competition among venture investors can weaken the normal mechanisms that challenge management decisions, while large valuations can reinforce the belief that the founder's strategy has already been validated. The danger is that valuation growth can substitute for operational accountability during the scaling phase, and by the time profitability, capital allocation, organizational complexity, or governance problems become visible, the company may already employ thousands of people and control significant amounts of capital. Another part of Damodaran's argument that I find important is that staying small should not automatically be interpreted as failure. Some businesses naturally have better economics when they remain concentrated around a specific customer base, product category, geography, or brand position, because expanding beyond that niche can weaken pricing power or require disproportionately higher capital and marketing spending. Ferrari is an obvious example of a company whose economics partly depend on scarcity, but the principle applies much more widely: maximizing revenue is not necessarily the same thing as maximizing enterprise value. A business generating high returns on capital within a limited market can be economically superior to a much larger competitor producing weak returns after enormous capital investment, which means the correct objective should ultimately be value creation rather than size itself. Personally, this is where I agree strongly with Damodaran, because I do not see profitability and growth as opposite objectives in the first place. A company should absolutely sacrifice near-term profits when it has opportunities to reinvest capital at attractive returns, especially when that spending strengthens distribution, technology, network effects, customer retention, infrastructure, or another durable competitive advantage, but there needs to be a credible economic mechanism connecting today's spending with tomorrow's cash generation. I care much less about whether a rapidly growing company currently reports a profit than about what happens to the economics of the next dollar of revenue, because improving contribution margins, lower acquisition costs, stronger retention, greater pricing power, and falling capital requirements provide evidence that scale is actually making the business better. This also makes the discussion extremely relevant to the current artificial intelligence cycle. Artificial intelligence companies are being pushed to scale models, computing infrastructure, data centers, users, enterprise distribution, and revenue extraordinarily quickly, while the capital required to support that expansion is also becoming enormous. Some of that spending could eventually create exceptional businesses if inference economics improve, utilization rises, customers become deeply embedded in the products, and artificial intelligence generates enough willingness to pay to produce strong margins, but scale alone cannot prove that outcome. If computing costs and capital requirements continue rising alongside usage, then very fast revenue growth could coexist with mediocre returns on capital, particularly when companies must continuously finance new generations of chips and infrastructure simply to remain technologically competitive. For me, the most important question in artificial intelligence therefore is gradually shifting from how fast these companies can grow to how much economic value remains after paying for the infrastructure required to generate that growth, because eventually the market has to separate companies that are using capital to build durable operating leverage from companies that simply need ever larger amounts of capital to keep the scaling story alive.

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  Prinsenry Thee 1st 📚💎 (@PrinsenryThe1st) reported 26 minutes ago

  There are times while scrolling on X, I stumble upon possible untapped topic ideas for book publishing and I note them down but I tend to forget about them. I’ve checked this topic on Amazon and there are no books there but it is a major problem most WOMEN face. At least, let someone benefit from my research but DYOR first. Publish at owners risk 🥸 FOLLOW FOR MORE UPDATES ON PUBLISHING ➕

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  Rochelle (@itsrochellaa) reported 26 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp But the problem is I also got a new mobile phone during my upgrade. So I don’t have a trusted device because of the new phone and new phone number now. How can I recover my account ? My email and postal address remain the same. And I have my ID. Please can you help

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  Ellie Jay - Sarcastic Author (@EllieJayWrites) reported 27 minutes ago

  Um... It happened again. Another paperback processed, printed and shipped on the same day that it was ordered. And it wasn't even to Canada this time. Did Amazon actually listen to my whining and fix stuff or am I hallucinating?

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  Elephant (@808crypto) reported 27 minutes ago

  @commonsenseplay This is a terrible take. AI has generated well over a trillion dollars in revenue since 2023. The people buying the chips, META, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, SpaceX know exactly what they're doing.

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  1 Aspen Tree (@Headqarters_69) reported 29 minutes ago

  @unusual_whales Why? What’s slowing Amazon down?

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  Robert Yang (@robertythoughts) reported 31 minutes ago

  POV: you bootstrap a CPG brand: > Coman goes bankrupt > 3PL steals inventory > Food scientist holds formula hostage > Get sued. 3 times. > 3 hires quit > 4 hires get laid off > 20 No’s from investors > Tiktok shop gets banned > Ad account gets banned > Amazon gets restricted > All time high materials prices > Tariffs cook margin > 4 pallets of inventory disappear > Container gets stuck at port for 3 months > $14k packaging misprint error > Only coman that will take u says $400k MOQ everything that can go wrong WILL go wrong… keep it pushin 🙏