Disney+ Outage Map

Community Discussion

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Disney+ Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

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  Free Me Not Audio (@FreeMeNotAudio) reported 21 seconds ago

  It's weird thinking that I've done audio editing work for like 10 years, but almost exclusively in content creation. I've worked for a few companies, and even one associated with Disney, but they weren't as rewarding.

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  Piyanuch Chanphet (@Piyanuch) reported 3 minutes ago

  @KennethFCrowe1 Do you work at Disney?

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  Mr.CanKnotNot (@canknotnot) reported 6 minutes ago

  @VoidNulled @KissofEnvyy We are agreeing, but you misunderstood what I was saying. Disney took a fans work, claimed it as their own, and is selling it. My point is that companies do not care as long as it makes money

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  Truth speller (@Spelleroftruth) reported 10 minutes ago

  @ManaByte Recasting. If done well, it may save the franchise while giving Disney new and young actors to work with moving forward.

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  Enigma (@Sanchyoloye) reported 11 minutes ago

  @michaelmiraflor it’s not just “Disney adults” causing the problem. The Walt Disney Company raises prices because lots of people want to go, and adults without kids spend a lot too,so the company caters to them. Also, adults enjoying Disney isn’t automatically a problem,it’s just people liking something nostalgic. Disney is trying to make more money, not just serve kids and families.

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  Wes Gay | StoryBrand (@wesgay) reported 14 minutes ago

  Disney Adults changed Disney for the worse They make the online Disney discourse toxic and change the environment at the parks It feels like Disney caters to them more and more while families get overlooked. Which is odd, because spend more at Disney as a family Disney works best when they solve one problem: creating a place where kids AND adults enjoy time together. Everything else is secondary Maybe the new leadership rights that ship And maybe they reduce the rampant availability of alcohol where they’re at it

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  Citizen_Jimserac (@jimserac) reported 16 minutes ago

  @LawrenceShaheen If the poor Disney execs need help, we can set up a seminar or something on: HOW TO MAKE PROFITABLE MOVIES, SUSTAIN POPULAR FRANCHISES, AND KEEP YOUR COMPANY OR DIVISION IN TIP TOP FINANCIAL SHAPE BY PLEASING THE FAN BASE INSTEAD OF IGNORING THEM.

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  LuziBuzi (@DeLuciosX) reported 16 minutes ago

  @basicallydjo It would have been a good StarWars stand alone movie. Basically, it's one big heist movie, after the heist. It was just a terrible sequel, because Disney was like: "We give the team all the freedom they want" and they were like "**** everything that was established".

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  William Crawford (@WilliamCraks8p) reported 16 minutes ago

  @FBI going back to the worst squib a few people protecting them in either directing and letting their ******* ***** Disney, to whoever consider themselves a ******* magician and back to the ******* red Ruby, Crystal that you never read and you’re just a bunch of ******* child unless there’s like the ******* rest of them

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  Nanocyde (@Nanocyde) reported 19 minutes ago

  @sircalebhammer The house of mouse is too expensive. Also all the other problems with Disney.

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  Mark Carr (@the1andonlyM) reported 20 minutes ago

  @dynastytribal Problem is: His built in Disney & YouTube audience will believe anything he says. Big problem with the kids who were raised on the internet

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  Elle D (@ellelledeell) reported 24 minutes ago

  @KGoBlue10 @dsegundo30 @RichJWidmann If believing I am one of the bad people makes you feel better, you do you But the real problem is Disney not caring about providing an experience. Why do they overcrowd the park, then sell fast pass? Because they know their 🐑 will fight ea other as they pay 💸 💸 💸

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  meggy! (@megmoobloom) reported 27 minutes ago

  @kiravvy8 yeah ddba isn't awful, but the pacing really hinders it. netflix dd gives you time to breathe and sit with the characters. it feels raw and grounded. imo the disney+ show is jam-packed with far too many storylines for 8 eps and daredevil himself feels like an afterthought.

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  David McKenzie (@mckenzielaw) reported 27 minutes ago

  This is what I think is going on with the Duke-Amazon deal and why the Big Ten is whining. It's all about a direct-to-consumer model and risk allocation. Let's start with the law because the law explains the deal. College sports media rights flow through a stacked architecture that schools rarely discuss in public but that governs everything they can and cannot do. Every ACC member, Duke included, has executed a Grant of Rights to the conference— an irrevocable assignment of media rights running through 2036. The ACC then licensed that aggregated catalogue to ESPN under a parallel agreement of comparable duration. The Big Ten and Fox sit atop an identical structure on their side of the ledger. The consequence is that Duke does not own the broadcast rights to its own basketball games in any meaningful sense. ESPN does. And Michigan's rights belong to Fox. That architecture is the entire reason the Amazon deal required permission rather than a checkbook, as suggested by @RossDellenger. Duke could not license a game to Amazon any more than a tenant could sell the building. What Duke could do is ask the actual rights holder — ESPN, through the ACC — to carve out three games from its exclusive bundle and allow Amazon to distribute them. ESPN agreed. Dellenger's reporting suggests ESPN extracted a licensing fee plus future Duke scheduling commitments in return. That is a sublicense, structured as a limited waiver of exclusivity, and it is the legal mechanism that makes the entire arrangement possible. Without ESPN's consent, the deal is a straightforward breach of the Grant of Rights cascade. With it, the deal is unremarkable contract law. Which brings us to the Big Ten. Its claim that it "owns" the Duke-Michigan game is the sound of a conference dressing up a contractual reciprocity provision as a property right. The actual mechanism the B1G is invoking is an alternation arrangement between the conferences and their rights holders for neutral-site games played in shared metropolitan territory with New York, a virtual home game for Duke, being the one at issue. Even taking that at face value, it is a contract claim running between the conferences, not a proprietary interest enforceable against Duke, Amazon, or Madison Square Garden. And the party whose alternation turn was supposedly violated, ESPN, has already blessed the deal. It is hard to articulate a coherent legal theory under which the B1G or Fox enforces ESPN's contractual entitlement against ESPN's wishes. The B1G's posture is a negotiating marker, not a litigation position, and any honest reading of the underlying agreements would say so. So why did ESPN say yes? This is where the law stops explaining things and strategy takes over. I'm not just guessing here. ESPN launched its standalone streaming flagship into a market in which the most important commercial question in sports media remains unanswered: will cord-cutters pay to watch a Tuesday-night college basketball game? Disney has spent the better part of a decade rearranging its streaming portfolio without producing a clean answer, and the cost of running that experiment on ESPN's own platform —with ESPN's own marquee inventory and ESPN's own reputation on the line — is considerable. The Pac-12 tried a version of this experiment with Apple two years ago. Apple would not pay linear money, the schools would not accept streaming-only reach, and the conference disintegrated before the deal did. The lesson the industry absorbed was that premium college sports was not yet ready for direct-to-consumer exclusivity. ESPN needs to know whether that lesson still holds, and it would prefer not to find out the hard way. The structure of the Duke deal seems to be the answer. Amazon bears the production cost, the promotional spend, and the conversion risk against Prime's installed 200M+ worldwide subscriber base. ESPN collects a licensing fee, future scheduling inventory it can deploy on its own terms, and a clean read on whether streaming-exclusive premium college basketball actually works as a commercial proposition. If Amazon's experiment succeeds, ESPN learns the model and pulls future games back in-house at the next negotiation. If it fails, Amazon absorbs the loss and ESPN quietly concludes the market is not ready, having paid nothing for the information beyond the foregone value of three games it was compensated for anyway. That is not a concession. It is a hedged bet, and a clever one. Fox cannot afford the same posture, which is why the B1G is whining. Fox One and Tubi are real but considerably smaller than the combined Disney streaming footprint, and every individual rights leak feels more existential to a network without the same DTC depth to fall back on. ESPN can be magnanimous because Disney has room to be patient. Fox and the B1G have less room, so the B1G is now tasked with escalating a routine reciprocity dispute into a public claim of ownership it cannot sustain. That tells you more about the B1G and Fox's competitive position than it does about the merits of the contract. The deeper point, and the one worth dwelling on, is that the rights architecture schools accepted a decade ago to keep their conferences intact is now being tested by the schools themselves. Duke did not break the system. Duke worked within it, asked ESPN for permission, gave up something in return, and brought a streaming partner to the table that the network was apparently happy to let bear the risk of an experiment Disney has not figured out how to run on its own. The B1G and Fox would prefer that schools not learn this trick. They are about to learn it anyway. And the next negotiation, whenever it comes, will reflect what Amazon's three games taught everyone about who the audience really is and what they will pay to watch. The Duke-Amazon arrangement is being described as a turning point for college sports media. My honest guess is that it's more of a market test, structured by a rights holder who needed information from a 200M+ subscriber base more than it needed three basketball games. It's now being resisted by a competitor who cannot afford to be that patient. The law explains how the deal got done. The strategy explains why ESPN wanted it done this way. And the Big Ten's complaint, stripped of its proprietary language, is the complaint of a network that wishes it had thought of it first.

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  𝖈𝖍𝖚𝖉 𝖕𝖊𝖗 𝖛𝖊𝖗𝖙 (@miraclecoaster) reported 27 minutes ago

  this is why we should ALL do horse week like i did 🙏🙏🙏 horse week could fix reductive takes like this 🙏 theres variety in horse stories if you just try to look instead of assuming everythings like the crappy disney movie 🙏🙏🙏🐴🐴🐴