Paytm status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours in Shirāla, Maharashtra

The chart below shows the number of Paytm reports we have received in the last 24 hours from users in Shirāla, Maharashtra and surrounding areas. An outage is declared when the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line.

Community Discussion

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Paytm Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Gautam Bhatia (@1gautambhatia) reported 5 minutes ago

  @Paytm I am not been able to log into my account as it shows app not supported,I have recently switched my phone .Help on priority

• 
  Prudvi_Bob ©️ (@PrudviVysyaraj) reported 6 minutes ago

  @Paytm @Paytmcare @SuryodayBank Paid ₹9,000 in full on 30 July & requested closure. Yet ₹180 Convenience Fee + ₹32.40 IGST was charged,and ₹212.40 was auto-debited on 3 Aug. Multiple emails to Suryoday Bank,but no acknowledgment or response.Why is customer grievance ignored?

• 
  CA Sridhar (@SRIDHAR00772301) reported 6 minutes ago

  Hi @Paytmcare @Paytm My order id 27406395348 Purchased a gift card of Decathlon but store people saying invalid requesting you to pls issue refund for the same. Its saying invalid code or PIN. Their gift card saying its start with 10 not 60 requesting you to pls issue refund.

• 
  CJ (@acjose93) reported 6 minutes ago

  @Paytm @Paytm @PhonePe_Support I’m facing an issue with a UPI payment that shows as successful, but the underlying transaction/payment issue remains unresolved. I’ve already tried to get this resolved but haven’t received a satisfactory solution. Please look into the matter

• 
  Yash Sharma (@ys_2800) reported 12 minutes ago

  @Paytmcare Issue resolved but this mis happening taken by merchant.

• 
  Hemanta Meher (@MeherHemantt) reported 17 minutes ago

  Guys don't trust @Paytm @PaytmBusiness @Paytmcare Your internal mismanagement should not become a customer's problem. My Soundbox return EO887528444IN was successfully delivered via India Post, but your team still claims its not received and asks me for POD. Very Bad experience😭

• 
  Mohan Bhog (@winner_platinum) reported 17 minutes ago

  @Paytm @Paytmcare @PaytmBank I have money in my Paytm Wallet , what is the claim procedure now since your bank is closing down ? Please explain to me the claim procedure.

• 
  tushar (@emailtj) reported 19 minutes ago

  @Paytm totally pathetic from paytm instead of solving issue with my merchant account they simply chose to deactivate it cant trust paytm anymore beware

• 
  Chinmaya (@ChinmayaSaxena) reported 20 minutes ago

  @Paytm Data leak risks worth considering if not considered and addressed already. Maybe good for the @Paytm team to share how these are addressed. This is again in our long term interest as a nation. Quoted directly from Claude response (disclaimer- Not my personal views, please validate) 1. Prompt injection via tool outputs. Transaction descriptions, customer names, order notes — any field an end-customer can populate — becomes untrusted text once it flows through the MCP tool result into Claude's context. A malicious "customer" could put an injection payload in a payment note field, hoping it gets executed when a merchant later asks Claude to "summarize today's transactions." 2. Over-broad OAuth scopes. If the merchant's connected token grants read access to all transactions rather than scoped by team/role, any employee with Claude access effectively gets visibility into full settlement and customer data, bypassing whatever RBAC existed on the Paytm dashboard. 3. Context leakage across conversations/sessions. If the same Claude account is used for other tasks, payment data pulled into context in one thread could plausibly resurface via memory/summarization features if not carefully scoped — worth checking how PPSL scopes token lifetime and whether Claude retains tool outputs beyond the session. 4. Third-party model exposure. Payment data (PII: names, phone numbers, partial card/bank details, amounts) now transits through Anthropic's infrastructure as tool-call payloads, even if not used for training. That's a new data-residency and compliance surface — relevant for RBI data localization rules and PCI-DSS scope creep. 5. Credential/session hijacking. MCP connector auth tokens, if long-lived, become a single high-value target — compromise of the Claude account (weak password, no 2FA, shared device) could give an attacker read access to a merchant's entire payment history. 6. No mention of masking. The post doesn't say whether sensitive fields (card BINs, UPI VPAs, customer PII) are redacted/tokenized before reaching the LLM context — a real gap for a blog post about a payments integration. 🙏

• 
  nik (@rhysnik) reported 25 minutes ago

  @Paytmcare Stop sending automated bot replies claiming a completed transaction is 'pending'! Read my issue: I am pointing out your app’s technical routing glitch, not asking for transaction status. Stop deflecting and provide a manual response from a human representative!