Paytm status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours in Hamīrpur, Himachal Pradesh

The chart below shows the number of Paytm reports we have received in the last 24 hours from users in Hamīrpur, Himachal Pradesh and surrounding areas. An outage is declared when the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line.

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

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Paytm Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Dil Se Unique ❤️🔥 (@dilseunique) reported 6 minutes ago

  Sir, I ordered a Paytm Soundbox, but the delivery partner delivered it to someone else and the order shows delivered. Please help resolve this issue. Note:- Paytm very bad service 🥲 Order I'd :- 27372240996 @Paytmcare @Paytm

• 
  Chiranjivi Raj (@Techie_Leaf) reported 9 minutes ago

  Due to this issue, I switched from @PhonePe to @Paytm .

• 
  🇮🇳Rao Sharukh🇮🇳 (@BeingRaoSharukh) reported 9 minutes ago

  Worst experience with Paytm. ₹6,225 was debited from account 3 days ago, yet the payment is still pending despite multiple complaints. Two tickets raised already but nobody contacted yet.   Call me now and resolve this issue now.       Con no - 9690773800 @Paytmcare @Paytm

• 
  BASTAGANAHAINA (@iloveeeeeeeuu) reported 9 minutes ago

  @divyanshifr @Paytm how it's working fine in my mobile cross cheked how in you it not working and in hour working fine. it will not work like that

• 
  Rupesh Jain (@RupeshJ23726629) reported 11 minutes ago

  I am not able to login in my account. Please provide me customer care no. @Paytm

• 
  Manik Nayyar🇮🇳 (@maniknayyar1) reported 13 minutes ago

  🚨IMP! Pls don't book train tickets from @Paytm as the app debits linked accounts without even entering a UPI PIN. I was just checking train ticket on paytm app and it asked me to login to IRCTC, which I didn't but my account was debited without login & UPI PIN @Paytmcare

• 
  Sanju Bai Bairwa (@SANJUBAIBAIRWA) reported 15 minutes ago

  Hey @PaytmCare, your service is shameful! You hide 'single-use' terms on flight vouchers to rob users. You stole my ₹2,281 and your agents shamelessly closed my ticket (200012349631) without resolution. This is outright fraud! Stop scamming and refund my money! #PaytmFraud

• 
  divas dwivedi (@divas_dwivedi) reported 15 minutes ago

  @Paytmcare @PhonePe please help here.

• 
  Chinmaya (@ChinmayaSaxena) reported 18 minutes ago

  @Paytm Data leak risks worth considering if not considered and addressed already. Maybe good for the @Paytm team to share how these are addressed. This is again in our long term interest as a nation. Quoted directly from Claude response (disclaimer- Not my personal views, please validate) 1. Prompt injection via tool outputs. Transaction descriptions, customer names, order notes — any field an end-customer can populate — becomes untrusted text once it flows through the MCP tool result into Claude's context. A malicious "customer" could put an injection payload in a payment note field, hoping it gets executed when a merchant later asks Claude to "summarize today's transactions." 2. Over-broad OAuth scopes. If the merchant's connected token grants read access to all transactions rather than scoped by team/role, any employee with Claude access effectively gets visibility into full settlement and customer data, bypassing whatever RBAC existed on the Paytm dashboard. 3. Context leakage across conversations/sessions. If the same Claude account is used for other tasks, payment data pulled into context in one thread could plausibly resurface via memory/summarization features if not carefully scoped — worth checking how PPSL scopes token lifetime and whether Claude retains tool outputs beyond the session. 4. Third-party model exposure. Payment data (PII: names, phone numbers, partial card/bank details, amounts) now transits through Anthropic's infrastructure as tool-call payloads, even if not used for training. That's a new data-residency and compliance surface — relevant for RBI data localization rules and PCI-DSS scope creep. 5. Credential/session hijacking. MCP connector auth tokens, if long-lived, become a single high-value target — compromise of the Claude account (weak password, no 2FA, shared device) could give an attacker read access to a merchant's entire payment history. 6. No mention of masking. The post doesn't say whether sensitive fields (card BINs, UPI VPAs, customer PII) are redacted/tokenized before reaching the LLM context — a real gap for a blog post about a payments integration. 🙏

• 
  YM (@im_whYM) reported 18 minutes ago

  @Superman18d Uninstall this **** app. Move to different payment app and enjoy life. @Paytm sucks.